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- /*
- * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry <wad@dataspill.org>
- * Copyright (c) 2015,2017,2019,2020,2023 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
- /*
- * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose
- * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production,
- * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context.
- *
- * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures.
- * E.g.
- * auditctl -a task,always -F uid=<privsep uid>
- */
- /* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */
-
- #if 0
- /*
- * For older toolchains, it may be necessary to use the kernel
- * headers directly.
- */
- #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
- # include <asm/siginfo.h>
- # define __have_siginfo_t 1
- # define __have_sigval_t 1
- # define __have_sigevent_t 1
- #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
- #endif
-
- #include "includes.h"
-
- #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
-
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/resource.h>
- #include <sys/prctl.h>
- #include <sys/mman.h>
- #include <sys/syscall.h>
-
- #include <linux/futex.h>
- #include <linux/net.h>
- #include <linux/audit.h>
- #include <linux/filter.h>
- #include <linux/seccomp.h>
- #include <elf.h>
-
- #include <asm/unistd.h>
- #ifdef __s390__
- #include <asm/zcrypt.h>
- #endif
-
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <signal.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-
- #include "log.h"
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-
- /* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */
- #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
-
- /* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */
- #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
- # undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL
- # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
- #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
-
- #if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
- # define ARG_LO_OFFSET 0
- # define ARG_HI_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t)
- #elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
- # define ARG_LO_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t)
- # define ARG_HI_OFFSET 0
- #else
- #error "Unknown endianness"
- #endif
-
- /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
- #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
- #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
- #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \
- /* load and test syscall argument, low word */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
- ((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \
- /* load and test syscall argument, high word */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
- (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
- /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
- /* Allow if syscall argument contains only values in mask */
- #define SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_mask) \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \
- /* load, mask and test syscall argument, low word */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~((_arg_mask) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 4), \
- /* load, mask and test syscall argument, high word */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \
- ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_mask) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 1), \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
- /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
- /* Deny unless syscall argument contains only values in mask */
- #define SC_DENY_UNLESS_ARG_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_mask, _errno) \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \
- /* load, mask and test syscall argument, low word */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~((_arg_mask) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 3), \
- /* load, mask and test syscall argument, high word */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \
- ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_mask) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 1, 0), \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno)), \
- /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
- #define SC_DENY_UNLESS_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val, _errno) \
- /* Special handling for futex(2) that combines a bitmap and operation number */
- #if defined(__NR_futex) || defined(__NR_futex_time64)
- #define SC_FUTEX_MASK (FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME)
- #define SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(_nr, _op) \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \
- /* load syscall argument, low word */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[1]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
- /* mask off allowed bitmap values, low word */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~(SC_FUTEX_MASK & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
- /* test operation number, low word */ \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, ((_op) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 4), \
- /* load syscall argument, high word */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[1]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
- /* mask off allowed bitmap values, high word */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \
- ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)SC_FUTEX_MASK >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
- /* test operation number, high word */ \
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
- (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_op) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
- /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
-
- /* Use this for both __NR_futex and __NR_futex_time64 */
- # define SC_FUTEX(_nr) \
- SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_WAIT), \
- SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET), \
- SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_WAKE), \
- SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET), \
- SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_REQUEUE), \
- SC_ALLOW_FUTEX_OP(__NR_futex, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE)
- #endif /* __NR_futex || __NR_futex_time64 */
-
- #if defined(__NR_mmap) || defined(__NR_mmap2)
- # ifdef MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE
- # define SC_MMAP_FLAGS MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_FIXED|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE
- # else
- # define SC_MMAP_FLAGS MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_FIXED
- # endif /* MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE */
- /* Use this for both __NR_mmap and __NR_mmap2 variants */
- # define SC_MMAP(_nr) \
- SC_DENY_UNLESS_ARG_MASK(_nr, 3, SC_MMAP_FLAGS, EINVAL), \
- SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(_nr, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE)
- #endif /* __NR_mmap || __NR_mmap2 */
-
- /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
- static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- /* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)),
- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0),
- BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
- /* Load the syscall number for checking. */
- BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
-
- /* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */
- #ifdef __NR_lstat
- SC_DENY(__NR_lstat, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_lstat64
- SC_DENY(__NR_lstat64, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_fstat
- SC_DENY(__NR_fstat, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_fstat64
- SC_DENY(__NR_fstat64, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_fstatat64
- SC_DENY(__NR_fstatat64, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_open
- SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_openat
- SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_newfstatat
- SC_DENY(__NR_newfstatat, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_stat
- SC_DENY(__NR_stat, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_stat64
- SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_shmget
- SC_DENY(__NR_shmget, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_shmat
- SC_DENY(__NR_shmat, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_shmdt
- SC_DENY(__NR_shmdt, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_ipc
- SC_DENY(__NR_ipc, EACCES),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_statx
- SC_DENY(__NR_statx, EACCES),
- #endif
-
- /* Syscalls to permit */
- #ifdef __NR_brk
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_brk),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_close
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_close),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_exit
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_exit_group
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_futex
- SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_futex_time64
- SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex_time64),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_geteuid
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getpgid
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getpid
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_gettid
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getuid
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_getuid32
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_madvise
- SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_NORMAL),
- # ifdef MADV_FREE
- SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_FREE),
- # endif
- # ifdef MADV_DONTNEED
- SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_DONTNEED),
- # endif
- # ifdef MADV_DONTFORK
- SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_DONTFORK),
- # endif
- # ifdef MADV_DONTDUMP
- SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_DONTDUMP),
- # endif
- # ifdef MADV_WIPEONFORK
- SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_madvise, 2, MADV_WIPEONFORK),
- # endif
- SC_DENY(__NR_madvise, EINVAL),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_mmap
- SC_MMAP(__NR_mmap),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_mmap2
- SC_MMAP(__NR_mmap2),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_mprotect
- SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mprotect, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_mremap
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_mremap),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_munmap
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_munmap),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_nanosleep
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_nanosleep),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep_time64
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep_time64),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR__newselect
- SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_ppoll
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_ppoll),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_ppoll_time64
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_ppoll_time64),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_poll
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_poll),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_pselect6
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_read
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_rt_sigprocmask),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_select
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_select),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_shutdown
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_time
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_write
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_write),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_writev
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_writev),
- #endif
- #ifdef __NR_socketcall
- SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
- SC_DENY(__NR_socketcall, EACCES),
- #endif
- #if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__)
- /* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */
- SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
- SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
- SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
- SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSECSENDCPRB),
- /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
- SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
- #endif
- #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
- /*
- * On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the
- * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g.
- * https://bugs.debian.org/849923
- */
- SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
- #endif
-
- /* Default deny */
- BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
- };
-
- static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
- .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])),
- .filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns,
- };
-
- struct ssh_sandbox {
- pid_t child_pid;
- };
-
- struct ssh_sandbox *
- ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
- {
- struct ssh_sandbox *box;
-
- /*
- * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
- * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
- */
- debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__);
- box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
- box->child_pid = 0;
-
- return box;
- }
-
- #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
- extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
- void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, int forced, const char *msg, void *ctx);
-
- static void
- ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
- {
- char msg[256];
-
- snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
- "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)",
- __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr);
- mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, 0, msg, pmonitor);
- _exit(1);
- }
-
- static void
- ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void)
- {
- struct sigaction act;
- sigset_t mask;
-
- debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__);
- memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
- sigemptyset(&mask);
- sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
-
- act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation;
- act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
- if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1)
- fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1)
- fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- }
- #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
-
- void
- ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
- {
- struct rlimit rl_zero, rl_one = {.rlim_cur = 1, .rlim_max = 1};
- int nnp_failed = 0;
-
- /* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */
- rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
- fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- /*
- * Cannot use zero for nfds, because poll(2) will fail with
- * errno=EINVAL if npfds>RLIMIT_NOFILE.
- */
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_one) == -1)
- fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
- fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
-
- #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
- ssh_sandbox_child_debugging();
- #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
-
- debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__);
- if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) {
- debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- nnp_failed = 1;
- }
- debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__);
- if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1)
- debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
- else if (nnp_failed)
- fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but "
- "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__);
- }
-
- void
- ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
- {
- free(box);
- debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
- }
-
- void
- ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
- {
- box->child_pid = child_pid;
- }
-
- #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */
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